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form of this policy has shifted in the changing circumstances of succeeding decades. The major phases, jointly defined by changes in U.S. policy and Cuban resistance, have been the U.S. move to low-intensity warfare and economic blockade after the failure of its 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and after Kennedy's 1962 October-crisis promises to the Soviets; diversion of the U.S. administration in the late 1960s, after the collapse of counterrevolutionary support in Cuba and the failure of the war in Vietnam; small openings in the 1970s due to some thawing in the cold war; an aggressive conservative resurgence during the "second cold war" of the 1980s, including proxy conflict with Cuba through the wars in Central America and southern Africa; renewed aggressive focus on Cuba during the country's economic crisis of the early 1990s, following the collapse of economic ties with the Soviet Union; and the current ambiguous period of commercial opening, accompanied by the Bush doctrine of preemptive warfare after the Al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. in 2001.
The U.S. arguments for a postcommunist "transition" in Cuba, asserting Cuba's place in a global trend toward "democracy and a market economy" (USAID, 1997; Powell, 2004) , carry much of the doublespeak of previous eras. Yet there are constraints on current U.S. arguments of "freedom" and self-determination while the Cuban government retains substantial popular support and while U.S. global interventionism faces widespread hostility. Further, U.S. arguments about a "free Cuba" cannot really be understood without reference to the economic blockade and low-intensity warfare against the island.
SIEGE AND COVERT WARFARE
After the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs and the subsequent missile crisis, the United States continued to train Cuban-exile groups at official military facilities such as Fort Benning and began to encourage semiautonomous operations by those groups. This latter strategy was intended to distance U.S. agencies from the bombings and murders, relying on the lack of accountability of the CIA and the U.S. doctrine of "plausible deniability" of its covert operations. A multitude of Miami-based organizations was created, all reliant on funds from the U.S. government and certain private foundations but with competing leadership groups. Their most persistent activities in the mid-late 1960s were terrorist sabotage and harassment operations focused on the placing of bombs on coastal shipping engaged in trade with Cuba. These bombings killed many people (Mendez Mendez, 2003) . There were also operations to confuse Cuban pilots, sabotage communications, and introduce corrosive agents into aircraft fuel. The U.S. government supplied a small flotilla of boats and planes, as well as weapons, for this purpose. The aims of these CIA-backed groups were broadly consistent with those of the public blockade: to destroy commercial and travel links with Cuba and to isolate the country so that somehow its social system might be overthrown. However, in the climate of "detente" in 1975, limited transactions between Cuba and U.S. subsidiaries were allowed so long as the products had no more than 20 percent U.S. content and no U.S. financing was involved (Alarc6n de Quesada and Alvarez Sanchez, 2001: 18). In the late 1970s, under the Carter administration, some diplomatic and community visits between the two countries began, but these tiny public openings were not mirrored in the politics of the clandestine war. Between 1975 and 1979 Miami reactionaries murdered four Cuban-Americans (Luciano Nieves, Ram6n Don6stevez, Carlos Mufiiz, and Eulalio Negrin) who had dared to initiate a dialogue with Cuban leaders. Reprisals for such dialogue were ruthlessly enforced in the exile community (Arboleya, 2002: 149) , and exile-group terrorism continued to enjoy impunity. 
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